Failure generates impulsivity only when outcomes cannot be controlled by Dyson, Benjamin James et al.
Failure-impulsivity during uncontrolled conditions 
1 
 
 Running head: Failure-impulsivity during uncontrolled conditions 
 
Failure generates impulsivity only when outcomes cannot be controlled 
 
 
Benjamin James Dyson 1,2 
Jukka Sundvall 1 
Lewis Forder 1 
Sophia Douglas 1 
 
1 University of Sussex, UK 
2 Ryerson University, Canada 
 
 
Address : School of Psychology 




Telephone : +44 (0)1273 876661 
Fax :  +44 (0)1273 678058 
E-mail : b.j.dyson@sussex.ac.uk 
 




Verbruggen, Chambers, Lawrence & McLaren (2017) recently challenged the view 
that individuals act with greater caution following the experience of a negative 
outcome by showing that a gambled loss resulted in faster reaction time on the next 
trial. Over three experiments, we replicate and establish the boundary conditions of 
this effect in the context of a simple game (Rock, Paper, Scissors). Choice responding 
against unexploitable opponents replicated the link between failure and faster 
responding. However, individuals with high win-rates against exploitable opponents 
initiated slower rather than faster responding following loss. The data suggest that the 
link between failure and impulsivity is limited to contexts where participants cannot 
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Public Significance Statement 
This study challenges the view that a gambled loss will always lead to subsequently 
impulsive behaviour. We show that individual success within these context 
determines whether future performance will be faster or slower following failure. In 
particular, impulsive behaviour following failure is more likely when an individual 
cannot control the outcome of their environment either as a result of interacting with 
an unexploitable opponent, or, interacting with an exploitable opponent whom they 
fail to exploit. When individuals demonstrate domination against an exploitable 
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According to the traditional view of post-error slowing (e.g., Notebaert, Houtman, 
Van Opstal, Gevers, Fias & Verguts, 2009) and conflict adaptation (e.g., Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 2001), people are more likely to proceed with caution 
following failure. In contrast, Verbruggen, Chambers, Lawrence & McLaren (2017) 
recently reported a series of experiments in which the experience of negative 
outcomes in a gambling context led to more impulsive (i.e., faster) reaction times 
(RT) relative to the experience of positive outcomes. Understanding individual 
impulses when engaging with purely-randomized gambling environments is clearly 
critical for addressing societal problems currently associated with fixed-odds betting 
terminal (FOBT) interactions.  
Verbruggen et al. (2017) described their data in terms of the acceleration of 
‘approach behavior’ since the central metric of interest was the speed with which 
participants initiated the next trial. This was distinct from a second, self-paced choice 
RT where participants decided whether or not to gamble again. Thus, the speeding 
associated with trial initiation might be quite different from the impulsivity associated 
with eventual choice RT. Indeed, their analysis of choice RT (Verbruggen et al., 2017, 
p. 157) was less clear in that responses following a gambled win were slower than a 
non-gamble baseline, despite the trial being initiated faster. In other words, 
participants might have been more impulsive in their approach behaviour but then 
were more cautious in deciding to gamble. To avoid the possibility that trial initiation 
and choice RT might conflict with one another, we focused on a simple Rock, Paper, 
Scissors (RPS) paradigm in which only one response was required per trial. Previous 
research using this paradigm (Forder & Dyson, 2016) also observed the finding of 
Verbruggen et al. (2017) in that choice RTs following negative outcomes (losses and 
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draws) were faster than those following positive outcomes (wins), thereby supporting 
a more direct relationship between negative outcome and impulsivity.  
One explanation for the observation of speeding following failure in gambling 
tasks but slowing following failure in cognitive tasks is the difference in responsibility 
one ultimately has in determining the outcome. Logically, if we operate in a purely 
random context then we are not culpable for our wins and losses. However, there are a 
number of gambling environments where outcomes are not only variable but also 
partly or wholly determined by skill (compare the continuum of roulette, blackjack, 
chess; Mauboussin, 2012). Over three experiments, we establish a replicable boundary 
condition that challenges the conclusion that “losses have a general effect on action” 
and that “in the context of potential rewards [losses] are emotional events that 
increase impulsivity” (Verbruggen et al., 2017, p. 147). To foreshadow our results, we 
found that a) negative outcomes do generate faster (i.e., more impulsive) subsequent 
decisions when outcomes were the result of chance play against unexploitable 
opponents but that b) negative outcomes did not lead to impulsivity when participants 
exhibited high win-rates against exploitable opponents. The data suggest that the 
degree of control one is able to exert over a variable outcome environment determines 
whether one becomes more or less impulsive after experiencing failure. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we attempted to replicate the findings of Forder & Dyson 
(2016) that negative outcomes yield faster decision-making than positive outcomes 
during RPS. For one condition, participants competed with a computerized opponent 
who behaved according to the mixed-equilibrium strategy (MES; Baek et al., 2013), 
with the randomized, equal (33%) selection of the three responses largely ensuring the 
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lack of opponent exploitation 1. This was contrasted with a second condition, where 
the computerized opponent was predictable on the majority of trials, and hence 
exploitable. We hypothesized that if impulsivity following loss was tied to a perceived 
inability to control outcomes, then this failure-faster link should be attenuated in the 
non-random (exploitable) condition relative to the random (unexploitable) condition.  
Method 
50 individuals (33 female) from the University of Sussex community 
participated in the study; mean age was 22.72 years (SD = 5.71) and 42 were right-
handed 2. Studies were approved for testing by the Life Sciences and Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee (C-REC) at the University of Sussex (ER/SEDD20/1), 
and participants were entered into a prize draw to win £25. Static pictures of a white-
gloved hand on the right (representing the participant) and a blue-gloved hand on the 
left (representing the opponent) depicting Rock, Paper and Scissors poses were 
displayed center screen at approximately 6º × 6º, with participants sat approximately 
57 cm away from a 22" Diamond Plus CRT monitor (Mitsubishi, Tokyo, Japan). 
Stimulus presentation was controlled by Presentation 18.1 (build 03.31.15).  
Participants completed 3 conditions consisting of 120 trials, in a semi-
counterbalanced order. In the middle (unexploitable) condition, the computer 
opponent behaved according to MES (i.e., 40 Rock, 40 Paper, 40 Scissors responses 
in random order). Participants were explicitly informed that their opponent would 
play randomly in this condition. The unexploitable condition was always flanked by a 
first and third condition (exploitable; the order of these two conditions was 
counterbalanced across participants), in which the computer behaved in accordance 
with a strategy for 72 (60%) trials where it would select the response that would have 
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beaten the player’s previous response (e.g., player trial n = rock, computer trial n+1 = 
paper), and MES for the remaining 48 (40%) trials. As a result of the behavioural 
isomorphism between differentially described strategies in Rock, Paper, Scissors 
(Dyson, in preparation), there was an additional language manipulation in the 
instructions between first and third conditions. For the first condition, participants 
were told “for most of the trials in the block, the computer’s strategy will be based on 
your previous selection.” For the third condition, participants were told “for most of 
the trials in the block, the computer’s strategy will be based on its last selection and 
outcome.” As a result of the equivalence in median RT (612 ms vs. 557 ms; t[39] = 
0.62, p = .533) and win-rate (44.21% vs. 44.58%; t[39] = 0.17, p = .863) between first 
and third conditions of the final sample (see Results), data was collapsed across these 
two conditions.  
At the bottom of the screen, the cumulative scores for both computer and 
player were displayed, in addition to the trial count within that block. At each trial, the 
participant pressed one of three buttons corresponding to Rock, Paper or Scissors, 
prompted by the presentation of a fixation cross. Following response, the participant’s 
selection was presented for 1000 ms. After the clearing of the picture (500 ms), 
feedback was provided for a further 1000 ms center screen as to whether the 
participant won, lost or drew the trial. Scores were then updated during a 500 ms 
period (+1 for win, -1 for lose, 0 for draw) and the next trial began with a fixation 
cross.  
Results 
 12 participants were rejected as a result of their average median RT being at 
least twice as large as the group average median RT (after Forder & Dyson, 2016) 
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within any ANOVA cell, resulting in a final sample of 38 (see Supplementary Table 
A for all descriptive statistics without outlier removal). A two-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA on trial n+1 median RTs using opponent (unexploitable, exploitable) and 
outcome at trial n (win, lose, draw; see Table 1) revealed a significant main effect of 
opponent [F(1,37) = 22.43, MSE = 49996, p < .001, ƞp2 = .377], a significant main 
effect of outcome [F(2,74) = 11.17, MSE = 14370, p < .001, ƞp2 = .232], and a non-
significant interaction [F(2,74) = 0.68, MSE = 12168, p = .508, ƞp2 = .018]. Tukey’s 
HSD test (p < .05) revealed RTs against the unexploitable opponent to be faster than 
those against the exploitable opponent (370 ms vs. 510 ms). Independently of the 
nature of the opponent, both losses (435 ms) and draws (397 ms) yielded subsequently 
faster RTs than wins (488 ms).  
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 replicated the central result of Verbruggen et al. (2017) and 
Forder & Dyson (2016) that negative outcomes yielded more impulsive decision-
making than positive outcomes (Supplementary Materials and Table 1 confirm the RT 
effect is carried by negative rather than positive outcomes by comparing game 
performance to a baseline where the participants merely observed the game). Negative 
outcomes yielded faster responding both when participants fruitlessly engaged with a 
random opponent (unexploitable), and also when they played against an opponent 
whose predominant strategy could be beaten (exploitable). While participants were 
more impulsive against an unexploitable relative to an exploitable opponent, the 
magnitude of the failure-faster effect was similar for both opponent types. One 
potential reason for this lack of distinction was that participants failed to successfully
Failure-impulsivity during uncontrolled conditions 




learn the correct strategy in the exploitable case, and so failed to control outcome to a 
meaningful degree. Indeed, this possibility may have been compounded by the use of 
two differentially described strategies that led participants to think that there were 
different rules to exploit. To increase the likelihood of strategy acquisition in 
Experiment 2, the frequency with which the opponent used their strategy was 
increased and the nature of the strategy was changed.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
40 individuals (31 female) from the University of Sussex community 
participated in the study; mean age was 21.13 years (SD = 4.37) and 39 were right-
handed. The protocol for Experiment 2 was approved under ER/JS753/1, and 
participants received course credit or £10 for their participation. Experiment 2 
involved a within-participants manipulation of both value (low, high) and opponency 
(unexploitable, exploitable) across four counterbalanced conditions (90 trials each). 
Value varied in terms of the points allocated for wins and losses (+1 / -1 in the low 
value condition, +3 / -3 in the high value condition, respectively) but was collapsed in 
the current analysis. In unexploitable conditions, the three responses of RPS were 
deployed randomly across 30 trials each (as per Experiment 1). In exploitable 
conditions, opponents used a strategy for 63 trials (now 70% rather than 60%) where 
it would select the response that would have been beaten by its own previous response 
(e.g., computer trial n = rock, computer trial n+1 = scissors), and played MES for the 
remaining 27 (30%) trials. The reduction in random (MES) trials increased the 
predictability of the opponent and increased the chance of exploitation. On any given 
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block, participants were not explicitly informed about the exploitable or unexploitable 
nature of their opponents.  
Results 
 5 participants were rejected as per Experiment 1, yielding a final sample of 35. 
Data revealed a non-significant main effect of opponent [F(1,34) = 0.67, MSE = 
158720, p = .420, ƞp2 = .019], a significant main effect of outcome [F(2,68) = 4.97, 
MSE = 77705, p =.010, ƞp2 = .128] and a significant two-way interaction [F(2,68) = 
6.26, MSE = 59400, p = .003, ƞp2 = .156]. Tukey’s HSD test (p < .05) revealed no 
significant differences in RT against an unexploitable opponent, although the pattern 
of data was similar to Experiment 1, with lose and draw trials yielding faster 
subsequent responses than win trials. Against an exploitable opponent however, lose 
trials (739 ms) were now statistically slower than draw trials (508 ms) and statistically 
equivalent but numerically slower than win trials (582 ms). Loss trials against 
exploitable opponents were also significantly slower than loss trials against 
unexploitable opponent (535 ms). 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 provides a unique case (contra Verbruggen et al., 2017, and, 
Forder & Dyson, 2016) where choice RTs following negative outcomes (specifically, 
loss) against an exploitable opponent were no longer faster than positive outcomes. In 
Experiment 3, we investigated the robustness of this interaction by using a different 
expression of strategy.  
Experiment 3 
Method 
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40 individuals (28 female) from the University of Sussex community 
participated in the study; mean age was 22.95 years (SD = 5.53) and 36 were right-
handed. The protocol was approved under ER/JS753/5. Experiment 3 again involved a 
within-participants manipulation of both value (low, high) and opponency 
(unexploitable, exploitable) across four counterbalanced conditions (90 trials each). 
This time, the low value conditions were associated with points only (+1 / -1), 
whereas the high value conditions were associated with points and converted to 
money at the end of the experiment at the rate of 10p per point (e.g., Losecaat Vermer 
& Sanfey, 2015). As such, participants received no less than £10 for the study but as 
in Experiment 2, performance was collapsed across value for the current analysis. 
Unexploitable and exploitable opponents were identical to Experiment 2, apart from 
in the exploitable condition the opponent now selected the response that would have 
beaten by its own previous response (e.g., computer trial n = rock, computer trial n+1 
= paper) for 70% of trials.  
Results 
 10 participants were rejected as per previous experiments, yielding a final 
sample of 30. Data revealed a significant main effect of opponent [F(1,29) = 5.59, 
MSE = 71493, p = .025, ƞp2 = .162], a non-significant main effect of outcome [F(2,58) 
= 2.40, MSE = 80532, p =.099, ƞp2 = .076] and a significant two-way interaction 
[F(2,58) = 5.11, MSE = 43722, p = .009, ƞp2 = .150]. Tukey’s HSD test (p < .05) 
revealed draw trials (513 ms) to be significantly faster than win trials (682 ms) during 
the unexploitable condition. No significant differences between outcomes were 
revealed during the exploitable condition, and loss trials against exploitable opponents 
(777 ms) were significantly slower than loss trials against unexploitable opponent 
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(572 ms). This replicated the slowing of choice RT following negative outcome in 
Experiment 2 when the opponent was exploitable rather than unexploitable.  
 A three-way mixed-model ANOVA including Experiment (2, 3) as a between-
participant factor, and, opponency (unexploitable, exploitable) and outcome (win, 
lose, draw) as within-participant factors failed to yield a significant main effect of 
Experiment [F(1,63) = 0.90, MSE = 257298, p = .347, ƞp2 = .014], nor, interactions 
with Experiment x opponency [F(1,63) = 0.50, MSE = 118568, p = .482, ƞp2 = .482], 
Experiment x outcome [F(2,126) = 0.13, MSE = 79007, p = .882, ƞp2 = .002], 
Experiment x opponency x outcome [F(2,126) = 0.41, MSE = 52183, p = .662, ƞp2 = 
.006]. The main effect of outcome [F(2,126) = 7.03, MSE = 79907, p = .001, ƞp2 = 
.100], and interaction between opponency x outcome [F(2,126) = 10.77, MSE = 
52183, p < .001, ƞp2 = .146] confirmed three central significant findings (Tukey’s 
HSD, p < .05). First, against unexploitable opponents, RTs following wins (672 ms) 
were slower than those following losses (552 ms) or draws (504 ms). Second, against 
exploitable opponents, RTs following losses (756 ms) were slower than those 
following wins (611 ms) or draws (564 ms). Third, RTs following losses in 
unexploitable contexts (552 ms) were faster than RTs following losses in exploitable 
contexts (756 ms).  
Discussion 
 Experiment 3 replicated the findings of Experiment 2 where the experience of 
loss did not lead to more impulsive action on the subsequent trial when outcomes 
could be controlled as a result of playing against an exploitable opponent. One reason 
why this effect was not present at the group level in Experiment 1 was that the degree 
of exploitation was lower than in Experiments 2 and 3 (60% strategy and 40% 
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random, compared to 70% strategy and 30% random). To test the idea that the degree 
to which participants were able to take control of the game outcome determined 
whether failure initiated impulsivity, individual win–lose rates were plotted against 
RT differences between lose and win trials during exploitation conditions in 
Experiment 1 (r = .647, p < .001), Experiment 2 (r = .577, p < .001) and Experiment 3 
(r = .575, p = .001; see Figure 1). It was apparent that for those individuals who 
established high win-loss ratios, a losing trial tended to slow rather than speed 
subsequent responding. Although the data are correlational rather than causal in 
nature, the suggestion here is that when participants develop a successful counter 
strategy against their opponent - allowing for a high degree of exploitation (wins) - 
loss trials slowed down rather than sped up subsequent decision-making.  
General Discussion 
Across three experiments using the game space of RPS, we established an 
important boundary condition under which the experience of a negative outcome leads 
to subsequent impulsive behaviour (Verbruggen et al., 2017). Impulsive behaviour 
following failure is more likely when an individual cannot control the outcome of 
their environment either due to a) interacting with an unexploitable opponent, or, b) 
interacting with an exploitable opponent whom they fail to exploit. Across all three 
experiments, we saw that when participants were able to enact a high degree of 
opponent exploitation, loss trials led to less impulsive rather than more impulsive 
reactions.  
The failure-faster link in random environments (e.g., unexploitable conditions) 
remains critical in understanding the emotional, cognitive and financial investments 
afforded by automated and random gambling systems such as FOBTs (Clarke, 2004). 
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Nevertheless, gambling environments with variable outcome can also have a large 
skill-based component. The observation that participants can still act impulsively 
following negative outcomes as a result of low win-rate in exploitable conditions 
underscores how the quality of own our meta-cognition regarding performance, and 
the perceived degree of control we have over outcomes (e.g., Langer & Roth, 1975), 
might perpetuate the magnitude and frequency of loss (e.g., tilting, Laakasuo et al., 
2015; chasing behaviour, Mitzenmacher & Upfal, 2005).  
Most strikingly, the observation that participants act less impulsively 
following loss during successful exploitation represents an important constraint in the 
relationship between loss and impulsivity. One possibility is that this observation 
reflects expectancy violation. This would appear to be true in the case where a 
participant selects the putatively correct response on the basis of their opponent’s 
common strategy, but their opponent happens to select from their (random) MES 
distribution on that trial. However, losses need not necessarily represent expectancy 
violation, such as cases where the player does not yet have a reliable understanding of 
their opponent’s dominant strategy. The current data would also seem to suggest that 
it is only unambiguously negative outcomes (losses) rather than ambiguously negative 
outcomes (draws) that puncture the failure-faster link (see Gu, Feng, Broster, Yuan, 
Xu & Luo, 2017, for further discussion). Future research incorporating individual 
differences in empathy, locus of control, personal understanding of luck – skill 
balance, accuracy of meta-cognition regarding one’s own performance, and the use of 
early neural responses to predict eventual behavioural outcomes will serve to further 
identify the conditions under which one becomes more or less impulsive as a function 
of outcome. 
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1 As one reviewer pointed out, this particular implementation of the MES raises 
the possibility of exploitation if a high degree of item bias is exhibited in the earlier 
stages of the block (e.g., opponent overplay of Rock in the first half of the block 
dictates underplay of Rock in the second half of the block). It is possible to estimate 
the degree of exploitation under such circumstances by examining participant win-rate 
in the second half of the block, as a function of the absolute deviation from the 
rectangular 33.33% distribution for Rock, Paper, Scissors responses expressed by the 
opponent in the first half of the block: if the player is sensitive to their opponent’s 
item bias, a larger deviation expressed by the opponent in the first half of the block 
should yield higher win-rate for the player in the second half of the block. We 
examined data from our Supplementary Experiment in which participants played 3 
blocks of 75 trials against an MES opponent. Average absolute deviation from 
33.33% for all three responses across the first 36 trials (range 1.86% - 7.41%) and 
participant win-rate across the last 36 trials (range 22.22% - 43.52%) was calculated 
within each block, and then averaged across block for each of the 36 participants. The 
non-significant, negative correlation between opponent random deviation and player 
win-rate (r = -.128, p = .458) did not support the idea that participants were using item 
bias to increase their success in the ‘unexploitable’ condition.  
2 To estimate the effect size and, hence, minimal sample size required for the 
comparison of RT as a function of outcome in Rock, Paper, Scissors, data from Forder 
& Dyson (2016) was utilized, collapsing across an original manipulation of value. 
With win RT = 708 (sd = 312), lose RT = 555 (sd = 207) and r = 0.707, Cohen’s d 
was estimated at 0.77. A sample size of at least 24 was estimated to observe this effect 
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size (two-tailed) with α = 0.01 and a power of 0.95. Sample sizes were also 
additionally determined by the application of the same outlier removal procedure 
applied across all experiments, and, the studies being derived from an on-going 
stream of research into competitive decision making that included other 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for Experiments 1 – 3 and Supplemental Experiment, with outlier removal  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
                Unexploitable Opponent    Exploitable Opponent 
    n After Win After Lose After Draw  After Win After Lose After Draw 
Experiment 1   38 407 (28) 367 (25) 336 (16)  570 (50) 504 (39) 457 (29) 
Experiment 2   35 664 (57) 535 (37) 496 (45)  582 (41) 739 (98) 508 (43) 
Experiment 3   30 682 (55) 572 (46) 513 (34)  645 (53) 777 (83) 629 (58) 
 
         Unexploitable Opponent (Play)   Unexploitable Opponent (Observe)  
     After Win After Lose After Draw  After Win After Lose After Draw 
Supplemental Experiment 31 564 (39) 484 (27) 493 (34)  539 (35) 534 (31) 527 (34) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
Note : Standard error in parenthesis. 
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Figure 1. Scatterplots comparing individual win – lose rates against RT difference between lose – win for across Experiments 1-3. 
 
 
